The Mind-Body Problem [antikvár]

PrefaceFrom time immemorial people have grown accustomed to accounting for their behavior and their subjective experience in terms of a soul or mind and its putative properties. Thus they say things like 'I have X on my mind', 'I am of two minds about T, 'May her soul rest in peace', and 'Upon my soul'.Then, at the beginning of our century, people were told by eminent psychologists and neurophysiologists that all talk of mind was nonscientifica mere remnant of primitive superstition. They were asked to give up, not only the theological notion of an immaterial and immortal soul, but alsó the very ideas of mentái abilities, dispositions, states, and events. And somé of them were successfully trained to speak only of observable facts, whether movements of the whole animal, or of somé of their parts.This ban on the concept of mind paralyzed somé philosophers, particularly those with positivistic leaningssince, after all, they had inspired the behaviorist movement. But others went on writing about minds, intentions, mentái images, and the like. This was to be expected, for most philosophers do not listen to scientists.In the meantime the eminent Jean Piaget, oblivious of behaviorist prohibitions, went on investigating the emergence and growth of mentái abilities in children and adolescents. Two decades later another equally influential rebellion spread: Donald Hebb stated that neuron assemblies may not only detect and process external stimuli but may alsó ideate. And he saíd loudly that humán psychology is about themind. Shortly thereafter the linguist Noam Chomsky launched a direct attack on mindless psychologywithout, unfortunately, rescuing the nervous system. This signaled the beginning of the end of the long and boring behaviorist night.