Bargaining and Markets [antikvár]

Preface The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. In this book we discuss two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. We do not attempt to survey the field. Rather, we select a small number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. We take the approach that a thorough analysis of a few models is more rewarding than short discussions of many models. Some of our selections are arbitrary and could be replaced by other models that illustrate similar points. The last section of each chapter is entitled "Notes". It usually begins by acknowledging the work on which the chapter is based. (In general we do not make acknowledgments in the text itself.) It goes on to give a brief guide to some of the related work. We should stress that this guide is not complete. We include mainly references to papers that use the model of bargaining on which most of the book is based (the bargaining game of alternating off^ers). Almost always we give detailed proofs. Although this makes some of the chapters look "technical" we believe that only on understanding the proofs IX