Dezinformatsia [antikvár]

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Disagreement clearly exists regarding the importance Moscow places in the utility of overt and covert propaganda and political influence techniques as instruments of foreign policy. This question continues to stimulate heated public debate in the West. On one side are those who believe that these techniques continue to play a central role in Kremlin strategy. Recently senior American and European officials have called attention to what they believe is a major and worldwide Soviet political offensive. Many analysts share this perspective. For example, one leading scholar of Soviet foreign policy, commenting in the early 1980s on recent developments in West Germany, has observed that "Soviet propaganda, directed by the International Information Department of the Central Committee, has effectively fed intellectual ammunition and, indirectly, probably some money to the West German peace movement." While maintaining that the peace movement was "neither begun nor is it controlled by Moscow," this specialist nevertheless concludes that the Soviets currently are "more active in West German politics than at any time since 1933."' Others disagree. They maintain that since the Soviet Union has become a military superpower, leaders in the Kremlin no longer regard these techniques as important. This study, however, concludes that 1 I ( I I I