Justifications of Environmental Protection [antikvár]

ABSTRACT Justifications of Environmental Protection Martin Schönfeld K environmental protection is justifiable in a pre-l^al, foundational sense, then theory must identify those positive values associated with nature that proceed from rationally defensible premises. This paper examines various justificatory approaches to environmental protection from the vant^e point of the following questions: Is the approach logically consistent? Are the basic assumptions of it defensible? Is the approach methodologically efficacious? Do conclusions entail the undesirability of paradigmatic cases of environmental degradation? "Common-sense" and "ecol(^ical," as well as pragmatic, aesthetic, and theological justifications are examined and rejected. The ethical-normative approach is then shown to be feasible and applicable. Contrary to current popular theories in environmental ethics, it is not asserted that the environment has moral standing nor that obligations toward sentient beings are to be analyzed in terms of the negativity of inflicting pain. Instead, it is argued that nonhuman vertebrates possess the same features that qualify humans as moral agents; therefore, a normative ethics that is not arbitrary must recognize the obligation to respect the continued existence of nonhuman vertebrates. This obligation entails the duty to conserve their habitats and constitutes the ethical justification of environmental protection.