Putin's Kleptocracy [antikvár]

INTRODUCTIONIN REACTING to Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine in early 2014, the U.S. government announced an unprecedented response: not the Russian state but individual Russian citizens would be subjected to asset seizures and visa bans. The Sixth Fleet was not called into action; exports to Russia as a whole were not banned; cultural and educational exchanges were not stopped. Rather, individual elites close to "a senior Russian Government official"^Vladimir Putin^were targeted.Probably the most serious international crisis since the end of the Gold War, and the White House targets individuals. Why this response? Because at last, after fourteen years of dealing with President Vladimir Putin as a legitimate head of state, the U.S. government has finally acknowledged publicly what successive administrations have known privatelythat he has built a system based on massive prédation on a level not seen in Russia since the tsars. Transparency International estimates the annual cost of bribery to Russia at $300 billion, roughly equal to the entire gross domestic product of Denmark, or thirty-seven times higher than the $8 billion Russia expended in 2007 on "national priority projects" in health, education, and agriculture.' Gapital flight, which officially has totaled approximately $335 billion since 2005,^ or about 5 percent of GDP, reaching over $50 billion in the first quarter of 2014 alone, has swollen Western bank coffers but made Russia the most unequal of all developed and emerging economies (BRIG: Brazil, Russia, India, Ghina), in which 110 billionaires control 35 percent of the country's wealth.^And these billionaires, far from being titans of industry motoring the