Solomonic Judgements [antikvár]

preface and acknowledgementsThe essays collected here form a sequel to Ulysses and the Sirens I (1979) and Sour Grapes (1983). As in these earlier books, the topic is rationality: its scope, limits and failures. A common premise of all three books is the normative privilege of rationality in the study^of human behaviour. Chapter 1 of Ulysses and the Sirens and chapter I of Sour Grapes attempted to define and defend this ideal of rationahty. In the first chapter of this volume I discuss how the ideal breaks down when it fails to tell people what to do or when people fail to do what it tells them to do. The latter failure, that of irrational behaviour, was extensively examined in both earlier works and is more briefly discussed here, in 1.4 and IV.4. The former failure, which arises when the notion of rationality is indeterminate, is the main topic of the present volume. The central argument is that rationality itself requires us to recognize this limitation of our rational powers, and that the belief in the omnipotence of reason is just another form of irrationality. To illustrate this proposition I consider both individual choice (mainly in chapters I and III) and social decisions (mainly in chapters II andiv).The book is bound to convey a certain disillusionment with instrumental rationality. The emphasis is not wholly negative, however. On the more constructive side, I consider several non-instrumental grounds for action. With respect to political choices, I argue in chapter IV that justice offers a guide to reform which is more robust than outcome-oriented considerations could ever be. With respect to individual choice, I mention briefly in chapter I that social norms can supplement or replace rationality in the explanation of action. 1 develop the latter argument at much greater length in The Cement of Society, a companion volume to the present