The Economist 2003 January-December I-IV. [antikvár]

The explosive Mr Kim America has few options in the face of North Koreán bomb-i ^HE IS putting on a brave face, but this cannot have been a happy festive season for America's president. Less than a year ago, in his state of the unión address, George Bush promised to make the prevention of nuclear proliferation a priority of his administration. He singled out three countries-Iraq, Iran and North Korea-as "an axis of evil" in hot pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. They would, he said, be stopped: the United States "will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons". Mr Bush's next state of the unión speech falls due at the end of January, one day after United Nations' arms inspectors are supposed to declare whether they believe Saddam Hussein is still seeking or concealing weapons of mass destruction. This could start the countdown to a war to topple the Iraqi dictator. But the choreography has now been spoiled by developments in another bit of the evil axis. Over Christmas, North Korea began to deliver fuel rods to the plutónium reactor at Yongbyon, and deactivated the cameras and electronic monitors un inspectors have kept there since 1994. On New Year's Eve the North Koreans kicked the inspectors out, and threatened to withdraw from the npt, the non-proliferation treaty under which they promise not to acquire nuclear weapons. Just when the Americans thought they had Saddam in their gunsights, attention has swivelled to Kim Jong 11, a no less brutal dictator much closer than his Iraqi counterpart to acquiring nuclear weapons, if he has not done so already (see page 45). The same, only different All this presents Mr Bush with a double embarrassment. It risks making him look weak. For all his previous tough talk about pre-emption, Mr Bush says for now that he hopes to sort out North Korea with diplomacy, not force. It alsó risks making him look inconsistent. Though he claims to be seeking a diplomatic solution in Iraq as well, it is plain to all that Mr Bush is ready to go to war the moment it becomes clear that Mr Hussein has squandered his "last chance" to save himself. Why, harrumph the president's critics, especially those who vehemently oppose war in Iraq, is America not preparing the same sauce for the Koreán goose as for the Iraqi gander? And yet the answer could not be more obvious. Mr Kim and Mr Hussein are perfect examples of the problem Mr Bush pinpointed in his evil-axis speech: the world's most dangerous regimes seeking the world's most destructive weapons. But the risks of using force in each case are different. This is not only because North Korea may have a few nuclear weapons already. It is because an attack on North Korea would almost certainly lead to carnage in the South. Seoul, the South Koreán capital, is only a handful of miles from the demilitarised zone which separates the two countries, along which somé im armed men are deployed. In a war the city could be flattened by the North's artillery. Iraq has not yet acquired nuclear weapons; and its depleted missile force, though a danger, is íaking. Which holds lessons for Iraq thought to pose no equivalent threat to its neighbours. A "consistent" approach that insisted on using force in all cases, regardless of the consequences, would be an absurdity. There is another sort of difference between Iraq and North Korea. Saddam remains in breach of a catalogue of un Security Council resolutions, the key ones having been brought under Chapter Seven of the un Charter, which can permit the use of force in enforcing the Security Council's will. In the case of North Korea, no such resolutions exist. Whereas Saddam hasdefiedtheuN since theendofthe Gulf War in 1991, North Korea has until recently (when the Americans found out about a secret uranium-enrichment programme) tried to give the impression of co-operating with international inspection regimes. The North Koreans have now put themselves thoroughly in the wrong; but it is reasonable to give diplomats a space of time in which to do their work. Saddam has already been granted more than a decade of jaw-jaw. Having failed in Iraq, can jaw-jaw resolve North Korea? Perhaps. The North's official média continue to insist that the country wants to resume talks with America. And the Americans, having first demanded that the North abandon its nuclear programmes before any talks could start, are sliding away from this stance. A senior State Department official is due to visit South Korea and Japan, and a régiónál meeting including the North Koreans may be possible. Furthermore, the North has so far failed to drive too big a wedge between the countries that share an interest in preventing it becoming a full-fledged nuclear power. America, Russia, China, South Korea and Japan have all urged it back from the brink. And America, South Korea and Japan agreed jointly to cut off the supply of fuel-oil under a 1994 agreement until it does. However, this unanimity may not last. America would like to step up economic pressure on the North, but the wretched place is at starving-point already. Neither the Chinese nor the South would welcome a totál collapse, or the refugees such a collapse would surely bring. There is, moreover, little agreement over the price worth paying to induce Mr Kim to take the inspectors back and put his plutónium and uránium under lock and key. The Americans are probably less inclined than are the nearer neighbours to give in to nuclear blackmail in return for a quiet life. It is not even clear that Mr Kim would be content for his blackmail to succeed. Last time the North was bought off-with the Clinton administration's 1994 "framework agreement"-it took the bribes but went on to develop that secret uranium-enrichment programme anyway. A stand-ofif in the Koreán peninsula is plainly not the prelude Mr Bush would have chosen for a war in Iraq. On top of war preparations in the Middle East, he must now struggle to keep an Asian coalition together without making too many concessions to those who will prefer to appease Mr Kim. If serial nuclear blackmail were to succeed in North Korea, other countries can be expected to take note. And Mr Kim will himself take note if, against all the odds, the distraction of North Korea lets Saddam Hussein wriggle free yet again. In more ways than seemed possible before Christmas, the credibility of Mr Bush's foreign policy is now on the line. ¦