The Life and Death of the Luftwaffe [antikvár]

FOREWORD TO THE AMERICAN EDITION The Life and Death of the Luftwaffe is in many ways an unusual and compelling document. As a personal narrative it neither seeks to glorify war nor to disclaim responsibility for Nazi crimes; it is the story of an officer who served his country with distinction and risked reprisals to speak his mind. As history—of the Third Reich in large and the Luftwaffe in particular—it is as objective, reliable, and revealing as any written at the command level. And most important, as an analysis of defeat it throws alarming light on the problems of preparedness now plaguing the democratic West. Werner Baumbach shows how Hitler was trapped by his decision for the quick war; that almost from the first Germany, geared to win with what it had, could never successfully adjust to delays in timetable and changing needs. Blitzkrieg settled into a long, chaotic struggle between planning and expedience; and step by step Germany fell victim to overcentralized control and erratic policy, red tape and inefficiency, inter-service rivalry and political favoritism, shortages of raw material, depletion of manpower, destruction of facilities, and finally the onslaught of overwhelming numbers and production. If Germany would have been defeated in any event, Baumbach leaves no doubt that Allied victory could have been far more costly. Today, with the United States and the Soviet Union in possession of weapons that can start and perhaps end the next war in an hour, the pressure to reconcile the short term with the long has increased manifold. For the Luftwaffe it was always "too late." It may not be too late to learn by its example.