The Possibility of Practical Reason [antikvár]

PREFACEThis volume contains the woric that I have done in the philosophy of action since completing the book Practical Reflection. One of the papers, 'Epistemic Freedom,' is an expanded version of a chapter in the book; it was written after the book went to press, though it was published first. I have included it here because I think that it significantly improves on the corresponding portions of the book. One or two of the other papers are attempts to build upon or renovate the theory set down in the book, but most of them are attempts to dig beneath it. Without even referring to that theory, I have tried to unearth more fundamental reasons for wanting a theory of its general formreasons for thinking that there ought to be a theory of its kind.In most cases, I have done my digging in areas familiar to philosophers of action: problems about agent causation, internal and external reasons, direction of fit, the normative force of formal decision theory, and the rationality of resolute choice. The papers therefore do more to situate my view on the philosophical map than I previously could, though they do less by way of filling in the details.The Introduction is an attempt to fashion a single narrative out of the main themes that appear in the rest of the collection. In concentrating on the flow of this narrative, I have tended to gloss over argumentative details, relying on the other papers to provide them. I have tried to indicate in the footnotes where detailed versions of the arguments can be found in the other chapters. The Introduction also records recent changes of mind about various issues.I have not revised or updated the previously published material in substantive respects. (I have made some minor adjustments in Chapters 9 and 10.) I have also retained the acknowledgements that originally appeared with the papers, thus ensuring that each paper contains at least one true statementnamely, that of my indebtedness to friends and colleagues. I have several debts, however, that are not adequately represented in those acknowledgements, and I would like to mention them here.Although each paper thanks many of my colleagues individually, none records my debt to the collective that they make up: the Department of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Whatever virtues my