The Process of the Indirect Exercise of Democratic Power [antikvár]

THE COMPLEX SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE In this study, my main objective has been highlighting the importance of the complex analysis of governance. In our days and age, referenda are less and less called upon, but when they do occur, they are more legitimate than the regular elections of representative democracy. The latter serve as the default chaimel of voter participation, creating parliaments through the will of citizens, which then proceeds to enact the most important state decisions. In a parliamentary system, the executive power is also legitimised by the legislative branch of power, while under presidential and semi-presidential systems, the head of the executive power is being selected through different methods. Examining the various forms of govenmient and thereby finding the most efiBicient method is strictly cormected to the analysis of the electoral system. Why is it necessarily so? Because the process of governance is a complex synthesis of constitutional and political factors which manifest, at the earliest stage, in the expression of the electorate's opinions, and finally concludes in direct state action in the form of legislation. This can happen indirectly through elected MPs acting on their mandates and also directly through comparatively infrequent referenda. For instance, in single-seat constituencies, if 30 percent of society share the same opinion on a matter, then the parties representing this electorate can acquire 50 percent of the seats in parliament, allowing them to decide as they wish. At the same time, the same 30 percent might be insufiicient for dominating parliament m a party-list proportional representation system. Passing certain legislation might conceivably require a qualified majority vote. In such a case, the absolute majority attained in single-seat constituencies would not be enough to reach a decision either. What can we expect in the event that the voters or their MPs change their minds regarding a given matter? Could the expression of their opinion be restricted by another branch of power? It is readily apparent from the comparison of my own monograph, written on the topic, with related international publications that the Hungarian form of government is lacking of control mechanisms. Checks could be introduced in the forms of a two-chamber parliament, referenda for constitutional amendments, or even a stronger president elected through popular vote or by an independent body. In the context of the separation of political powers, the Constitutional Court can be considered as a very strong entity; however, the single-channel nomination of constitutional judges further empowers the politicians. In majoritarian voting systems, disproportionality is usually regarded as the disadvantage of the system, while the possibility to vote for an individual is commonly regarded as an advantage. I have emphasised the fact that even while voting for individual candidates, the electorate will tend to consider the political parties behind them. This can be explained by the increasing role of the media projecting - and scaring voters with - the self-fulfilling prophecy that their favoured party will drop out; as a consequence, in a preferential party-list election (which is also proportional), de facto, constituents have a greater chance to choose between individuals. (The voters' ability in having a say could range from the marginal to compiling the whole list). It bears a great effect on government efficiency whether voters are giving out mandates for four guaranteed years, or if certain checks and balances - in the form of a second chamber